GAO
United States Government Accountability Office
Testimony
Before the Subcommittee on Strategic
Forces, Committee on Armed Services,
U.S. Senate
SPACE ACQUISITIONS
DOD Faces Substantial
Challenges in Developing
New Space Systems
Statement of Cristina T. Chaplain, Director
Acquisition and Sourcing Management
For Release on Delivery
Expected at 2:00 p.m. EDT
Wednesday, May 20, 2009
GAO-09-705T
What GAO Found
United States Government Accountability Office
Why GAO Did This Study
Highlights
Accountability Integrity Reliability
May 20. 2009
SPACE ACQUISITIONS
DOD Faces Substantial Challenges in Developing
New Space Systems
Highlights of GAO-09-705T, a testimony
before the Subcommittee on Strategic
Forces, Committee on Armed Services,
U.S. Senate
Despite a growing investment in
space, the majority of large-scale
acquisition programs in the
Department of Defense’s (DOD)
space portfolio have experienced
problems during the past two
decades that have driven up cost
and schedules and increased
technical risks. The cost resulting
from acquisition problems along
with the ambitious nature of space
programs has resulted in
cancellations of programs that
were expected to require
investments of tens of billions of
dollars. Along with the cost
increases, many programs are
experiencing significant schedule
delays—at least 7 years—resulting
in potential capability gaps in areas
such as positioning, navigation, and
timing; missile warning; and
weather monitoring.
This testimony focuses on
•
the condition of space
acquisitions,
•
causal factors, and
•
recommendations for better
positioning programs and
industry for success.
In preparing this testimony, GAO
relied on its body of work in space
and other programs, including
previously issued GAO reports on
assessments of individual space
programs, common problems
affecting space system acquisitions,
and DOD’s acquisition policies.
Estimated costs for major space acquisition programs have increased by
about $10.9 billion from initial estimates for fiscal years 2008 through 2013. As
seen in the figure below, in several cases, DOD has had to cut back on
quantity and capability in the face of escalating costs.
Total Cost Differences from Program Start to Most Recent Estimates
Legend: SBIRS = Space Based Infrared System, GPS = Global Positioning System, WGS =
Wideband Global SATCOM, AEHF = Advanced Extremely High Frequency, NPOESS = National
Polar-orbiting Operational Environmental Satellite System, and MUOS = Mobile User Objective
System.
Several causes behind the cost growth and related problems consistently
stand out. First, DOD starts more weapon programs than it can afford,
creating competition for funding that, in part, encourages low cost estimating
and optimistic scheduling. Second, DOD has tended to start its space
programs before it has the assurance that the capabilities it is pursuing can be
achieved within available resources.
GAO and others have identified a number of pressures associated with the
contractors that develop space systems for the government that have
hampered the acquisition process, including ambitious requirements and
shortages of technical expertise in the workforce. Although DOD has taken a
number of actions to address the problems on which GAO has reported,
additional leadership and support are still needed to ensure that reforms that
DOD has begun will take hold.
View GAO-09-705T or key components.
For more information, contact Cristina T.
Chaplain, 202-512-4841, chaplainc@gao.gov.
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Mr. Chairman and Members of the Subcommittee:
I am pleased to be here today to discuss the Department of Defense’s
(DOD) space acquisitions. The topic of today’s hearing is critically
important. Despite a growing investment in space, the majority of large-
scale acquisition programs in DOD’s space portfolio have experienced
problems during the past two decades that have driven up cost and
schedules and increased technical risks. The cost resulting from
acquisition problems along with the ambitious nature of space programs
has resulted in cancellations of programs that were expected to require
investments of tens of billions of dollars, including the recently proposed
cancellation of the Transformational Satellite Communications System
(TSAT). Moreover, along with the cost increases, many programs are
experiencing significant schedule delays—at least 7 years—resulting in
potential capability gaps in areas such as positioning, navigation, and
timing; missile warning; and weather monitoring.
My testimony today will focus on the condition of space acquisitions,
causal factors, and recommendations for better positioning programs for
success. Many of these have been echoed by the Allard Commission,
which studied space issues in response to a requirement in the John
Warner National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2007, and by a
study by the House Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence (HPSCI),
among other groups. The two studies highlighted concerns about diffuse
leadership for military and intelligence space efforts and declining
numbers of space engineering and technical professionals. Members of the
Allard Commission were unanimous in their conviction that without
significant improvements in the leadership and management of national
security space programs, U.S. space preeminence will erode “to the extent
that space ceases to provide a competitive national security advantage.”
1 Institute for Defense Analyses, Leadership, Management, and Organization for National
Security Space: Report to Congress of the Independent Assessment Panel on the
Organization and Management of National Security Space
(Alexandria, Va.: July 2008).
2 House Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence, Report on Challenges and
Recommendations for United States Overhead Architecture
(Washington, D.C.: October
2008).
Figure 1 compares original cost estimates and current cost estimates for
the broader portfolio of major space acquisitions for fiscal years 2008
through 2013. The wider the gap between original and current estimates,
the fewer dollars DOD has available to invest in new programs. As shown
in the figure, estimated costs for the major space acquisition programs
have increased by about $10.9 billion from initial estimates for fiscal years
2008 through 2013. The declining investment in the later years is the result
of the Evolved Expendable Launch Vehicle (EELV) program’s no longer
being considered a major acquisition program and the cancellation and
proposed cancellation of two development efforts that would have
significantly increased DOD’s major space acquisition investment.
Space Acquisition
Problems Persist
Figure 1: Comparison between Original Cost Estimates and Current Cost Estimates
for Selected Major Space Acquisition Programs for Fiscal Years 2008 through 2013
Note: The acquisition programs include Advanced Extremely High Frequency, Global Broadcast
Service, Global Positioning System II, Global Positioning System IIIA, Mobile User Objective System,
National Polar-orbiting Operational Environmental Satellite System, Space Based Infrared System,
and Wideband Global SATCOM.
Figures 2 and 3 reflect differences in total life-cycle and unit costs for
satellites from the time the programs officially began to their most recent
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cost estimate. As figure 2 notes, in several cases, DOD has had to cut back
on quantity and capability in the face of escalating costs. For example, two
satellites and four instruments were deleted from National Polar-orbiting
Operational Environmental Satellite System (NPOESS) and four sensors
are expected to have fewer capabilities. This will reduce some planned
capabilities for NPOESS as well as planned coverage.
Figure 2: Differences in Total Life-Cycle Program Costs from Program Start and
Most Recent Estimates
Legend: SBIRS = Space Based Infrared System, GPS = Global Positioning System, WGS =
Wideband Global SATCOM, AEHF = Advanced Extremely High Frequency, NPOESS = National
Polar-orbiting Operational Environmental Satellite System, and MUOS = Mobile User Objective
System.
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Figure 3: Differences in Unit Costs from Program Start to Most Recent Estimates
Legend: SBIRS = Space Based Infrared System, GPS = Global Positioning System, WGS =
Wideband Global SATCOM, AEHF = Advanced Extremely High Frequency, NPOESS = National
Polar-orbiting Operational Environmental Satellite System, and MUOS = Mobile User Objective
System.
Figure 4 highlights the additional estimated months needed to complete
programs. These additional months represent time not anticipated at the
programs’ start dates. Generally, the further schedules slip, the more DOD
is at risk of not sustaining current capabilities. For this reason, DOD began
a follow-on system effort, now known as Third Generation Infrared
Surveillance, to run in parallel with the Space Based Infrared System
(SBIRS) program.
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Figure 4: Differences in Total Number of Months to Initial Operational Capability
(IOC) from Program Start and Most Recent Estimates
Legend: SBIRS = Space Based Infrared System, GPS = Global Positioning System, WGS =
Wideband Global SATCOM, AEHF = Advanced Extremely High Frequency, NPOESS = National
Polar-orbiting Operational Environmental Satellite System, and MUOS = Mobile User Objective
System.
This fiscal year, DOD launched the second Wideband Global SATCOM
(WGS) satellite. WGS had previously been experiencing technical and
other problems, including improperly installed fasteners and data
transmission errors. When DOD finally resolved these issues, it
significantly advanced capability available to warfighters. Additionally, the
EELV program had its 23rd consecutive successful operational launch in
April. However, other major space programs have had setbacks. For
example:
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•
In September 2008, the Air Force reported a Nunn-McCurdy unit cost
breach of the critical cost growth threshold
3 for the Advanced Extremely
High Frequency (AEHF) communications satellite because of cost growth
brought on by technical issues, schedule delays, and increased costs for
the procurement of a fourth AEHF satellite. The launch of the first satellite
has slipped further by almost 2 years from November 2008 to as late as
September 2010. Further, the program office estimates that the fourth
AEHF satellite could cost more than twice the third satellite because some
components that are no longer manufactured will have to be replaced and
production will have to be restarted after a 4-year gap. Because of these
delays, initial operational capability has slipped 3 years—from 2010 to
2013.
•
The Mobile User Objective System (MUOS) communications satellite
estimates an 11-month delay—from March 2010 to February 2011—in the
delivery of on-orbit capability from the first satellite. Further, contractor
costs for the space segment have increased about 48 percent because of
the additional labor required to address issues related to satellite design
complexity, satellite weight, and satellite component test anomalies and
associated rework. Despite the contractor’s cost increases, the program
has been able to remain within its baseline program cost estimate.
•
The first Global Positioning System (GPS) IIF satellite is now expected to
be delayed almost 3 years from its original launch date to November 2009.
Also, the cost of GPS IIF is now expected to be about $1.6 billion—about
$870 million over the original cost estimate of $729 million. (This
approximately 119 percent cost increase is not that noticeable in figures 2
and 3 because the GPS II modernization program includes the
development and procurement of 33 satellites, only 12 of which are IIF
satellites.) The Air Force has had difficulty in the past building GPS
satellites within cost and schedule goals because of significant technical
problems—which still threaten its delivery schedule—and challenges it
faced with a different contractor for the IIF program, which did not
possess the same expertise as the previous GPS contractor. Further, while
the Air Force is structuring the new GPS IIIA program to prevent mistakes
made on the IIF program, the Air Force is aiming to deploy the GPS IIIA
satellites 3 years faster than the IIF satellites. We believe the IIIA schedule
is optimistic given the program’s late start, past trends in space
acquisitions, and challenges facing the new contractor.
3 10 U.S.C. § 2433 establishes the requirement for unit cost reports. If certain unit cost
thresholds are exceeded (known as Nunn-McCurdy breaches), DOD is required to report to
Congress and, in certain circumstances, if DOD determines that specific criteria are met,
certify the program to Congress.
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•
Total program cost for the SBIRS program is estimated around $12.2
billion, an increase of $7.5 billion over the original program’s cost, which
included 5 geosynchronous earth orbit (GEO) satellites. The first GEO
satellite has been delayed at least 7 years in part because of poor
oversight, technical complexities, and rework. Although the program
office set December 2009 as the new launch goal for the satellite, it is
currently assessing the satellite launch schedule and expects to have a
new plan in place by June 2009. Subsequent GEO satellites have also
slipped as a result of flight software design issues.
•
The NPOESS program has experienced problems with replenishing the
current constellation of aging weather satellites and was restructured in
July 2007 in response to a Nunn-McCurdy unit cost breach of the critical
cost-growth threshold. The program was originally estimated to cost about
$6.5 billion for six satellites from 1995 through 2018. The restructured
program called for reducing the number of satellites from six to four and
included an overall increase in program costs, delays in satellite launches,
and deletions or replacements of satellite sensors. Although the number of
satellites has been reduced, total costs have increased by almost 108
percent since program start. Specifically, the current estimated life-cycle
cost of the restructured program is now about $13.5 billion for four
satellites through 2026. This amount is higher than what is reflected in
figure 2 as it represents the most recent GAO estimate as opposed to the
DOD estimates used in the figure. We reported last year that poor
workmanship and testing delays caused an 8-month slip in the delivery of
a complex imaging sensor. This late delivery caused a delay in the
expected launch date of a demonstration satellite, moving it from late
September 2009 to early January 2011.
This year it is also becoming more apparent that space acquisition
problems are leading to potential gaps in the delivery of critical
capabilities. For example, DOD faces a potential gap in protected military
communications caused by delays in the AEHF program and the proposed
cancellation of the TSAT program, which itself posed risks in schedule
delays because of TSAT’s complexity and funding cuts designed to ensure
technology objectives were achievable. DOD faces a potential gap in ultra
high frequency (UHF) communications capability caused by the
unexpected failures of two satellites already in orbit and the delays
resulting from the MUOS program. DOD also faces potential gaps or
decreases in positioning, navigation and timing capabilities because of late
delivery of the GPS IIF satellites and the late start of the GPS IIIA
program. There are also concerns about potential gaps in missile warning
and weather monitoring capabilities because of delays in SBIRS and
NPOESS.
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Addressing gaps in any one of these areas is not a simple matter. While
there may be opportunities to build less complex “gap filler” satellites, for
example, these still require time and money that may not be readily
available because of commitments to the longer-term programs. There
may also be opportunities to continue production of “older” generation
satellites, but such efforts also require time and money that may not be
readily available and may face other challenges such as restarting
production lines and addressing issues related to obsolete parts and
materials. Further, satellites on orbit can be made to last longer by turning
power off at certain points in time, but this may also present unacceptable
trade-offs in capability.
Our past work has identified a number of causes behind the cost growth
and related problems, but several consistently stand out. First, on a broad
scale, DOD starts more weapon programs than it can afford, creating a
competition for funding that encourages low cost estimating, optimistic
scheduling, overpromising, suppressing bad news, and, for space
programs, forsaking the opportunity to identify and assess potentially
more executable alternatives. Programs focus on advocacy at the expense
of realism and sound management. Invariably, with too many programs in
its portfolio, DOD is forced to continually shift funds to and from
programs—particularly as programs experience problems that require
additional time and money to address. Such shifts, in turn, have had costly,
reverberating effects.
Underlying Reasons
for Cost and Schedule
Growth
Second, DOD has tended to start its space programs too early, that is,
before it has the assurance that the capabilities it is pursuing can be
achieved within available resources and time constraints. This tendency is
caused largely by the funding process, since acquisition programs attract
more dollars than efforts concentrating solely on proving technologies.
Nevertheless, when DOD chooses to extend technology invention into
acquisition, programs experience technical problems that require large
amounts of time and money to fix. Moreover, when this approach is
followed, cost estimators are not well positioned to develop accurate cost
estimates because there are too many unknowns. Put more simply, there is
no way to accurately estimate how long it would take to design, develop,
and build a satellite system when critical technologies planned for that
system are still in relatively early stages of discovery and invention.
While our work has consistently found that maturing technologies before a
program’s start is a critical enabler of success, it is important to keep in
mind that this is not the only solution. Both the TSAT and the Space Radar
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development efforts, for example, were seeking to mature critical
technologies before program start, but they faced other risks related to the
systems’ complexity, affordability, and other development challenges.
Ultimately, Space Radar was cancelled, and DOD has proposed the
cancellation of TSAT. Last year, we cited the MUOS program’s attempts to
mature critical technologies before the program’s start as a best practice,
but the program has since encountered technical problems related to
design issues and test anomalies.
Third, programs have historically attempted to satisfy all requirements in a
single step, regardless of the design challenge or the maturity of the
technologies necessary to achieve the full capability. DOD has preferred to
make fewer but heavier, larger, and more complex satellites that perform a
multitude of missions rather than larger constellations of smaller, less
complex satellites that gradually increase in sophistication. This has
stretched technology challenges beyond current capabilities in some cases
and vastly increased the complexities related to software. Programs also
seek to maximize capability because it is expensive to launch satellites. A
launch using a medium- or intermediate-lift EELV, for example, would cost
roughly $65 million.
Fourth, several of today’s high-risk space programs began in the late
1990s, when DOD structured contracts in a way that reduced government
oversight and shifted key decision-making responsibility onto contractors.
This approach—known as Total System Performance Responsibility, or
TSPR—was intended to facilitate acquisition reform and enable DOD to
streamline its acquisition process and leverage innovation and
management expertise from the private sector. Specifically, TSPR gave a
contractor total responsibility for the integration of an entire weapon
system and for meeting DOD’s requirements. However, because this
reform made the contractor responsible for day-to-day program
management, DOD did not require formal deliverable documents—such as
earned value management reports—to assess the status and performance
of the contractor. The resulting erosion of DOD’s capability to lead and
manage the space acquisition process magnified problems related to
requirements creep and poor contractor performance. Further, the
reduction in government oversight and involvement led to major
reductions in various government capabilities, including cost-estimating
and systems-engineering staff. The loss of cost-estimating and systems-
engineering staff in turn led to a lack of technical data needed to develop
sound cost estimates.
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Over the past decade, we have identified best practices that DOD space
programs can benefit from. DOD has taken a number of actions to address
the problems on which we have reported. These include initiatives at the
department level that will affect its major weapons programs, as well as
changes in course within specific Air Force programs. Although these
actions are a step in the right direction, additional leadership and support
are still needed to ensure that reforms that DOD has begun will take hold.
Actions Needed to
Address Space and
Weapon Acquisition
Problems
Our work—which is largely based on best practices in the commercial
sector—has recommended numerous actions that can be taken to address
the problems we identified. Generally, we have recommended that DOD
separate technology discovery from acquisition, follow an incremental
path toward meeting user needs, match resources and requirements at
program’s start, and use quantifiable data and demonstrable knowledge to
make decisions to move to next phases. We have also identified practices
related to cost estimating, program manager tenure, quality assurance,
technology transition, and an array of other aspects of acquisition-program
management that could benefit space programs. Table 1 highlights these
practices.
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Table 1: Actions Needed to Address Space and Weapon Acquisition Problems
Before undertaking new programs
•
Prioritize investments so that projects can be fully funded and it is clear where
projects stand in relation to the overall portfolio.
•
Follow an evolutionary path toward meeting mission needs rather than attempting to
satisfy all needs in a single step.
•
Match requirements to resources—that is, time, money, technology, and people—
before undertaking a new development effort.
•
Research and define requirements before programs are started and limit changes
after they are started.
•
Ensure that cost estimates are complete, accurate, and updated regularly.
•
Commit to fully fund projects before they begin.
•
Ensure that critical technologies are proven to work as intended before programs
are started.
•
Assign more ambitious technology development efforts to research departments
until they are ready to be added to future generations (increments) of a product.
•
Use systems engineering to close gaps between resources and requirements before
launching the development process.
During program development
•
Use quantifiable data and demonstrable knowledge to make go/no-go decisions,
covering critical facets of the program such as cost, schedule, technology readiness,
design readiness, production readiness, and relationships with suppliers.
•
Do not allow development to proceed until certain thresholds are met—for example,
a high proportion of engineering drawings completed or production processes under
statistical control.
•
Empower program managers to make decisions on the direction of the program and
to resolve problems and implement solutions.
•
Hold program managers accountable for their choices.
•
Require program managers to stay with a project to its end.
•
Hold suppliers accountable to deliver high-quality parts for their products through
such activities as regular supplier audits and performance evaluations of quality and
delivery, among other things.
•
Encourage program managers to share bad news, and encourage collaboration and
communication.
Source: GAO.
DOD is attempting to implement some of these practices for its major
weapon programs. For example, as part of its strategy for enhancing the
roles of program managers in major weapon system acquisitions, the
department has established a policy that requires formal agreements
among program managers, their acquisition executives, and the user
community that set forth common program goals. These agreements are
intended to be binding and to detail the progress a program is expected to
make during the year and the resources the program will be provided to
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reach these goals. DOD is also requiring program managers to sign tenure
agreements so that their tenure will correspond to the next major
milestone review closest to 4 years. Over the past few years, DOD has also
been testing portfolio management approaches in selected capability
areas—command and control, net-centric operations, battlespace
awareness, and logistics—to facilitate more strategic choices for resource
allocation across programs.
Within the space community, cost estimators from industry and agencies
involved in space have been working together to improve the accuracy and
quality of their estimates. In addition, on specific programs, actions have
been taken to prevent mistakes made in the past. For example, on the GPS
IIIA program, the Air Force is using an incremental development
approach, where it will gradually meet the needs of its users, use military
standards for satellite quality, conduct multiple design reviews, exercise
more government oversight and interaction with the contractor and spend
more time at the contractor’s site, and use an improved risk management
process. On the SBIRS program, the Air Force acted to strengthen
relationships between the government and the SBIRS contractor team, and
to implement more effective software development practices as it sought
to address problems related to its flight software system. Correspondingly,
DOD’s Office of the Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition,
Technology, and Logistics is asking space programs to take specific
measures to better hold contractors accountable through linking award
and incentive fees to program milestones. DOD interim space guidance
also asks space programs to make independent technology readiness
assessments at particular points in the acquisition process and to hold
requirements stable.
Furthermore, the Air Force, U.S. Strategic Command, and other key
organizations have made progress in implementing the Operationally
Responsive Space (ORS) initiative. This initiative encompasses several
separate endeavors with a goal to provide short-term tactical capabilities
as well as identifying and implementing long-term technology and design
solutions to reduce the cost and time of developing and delivering simpler
satellites in greater numbers. ORS provides DOD with an opportunity to
work outside the typical acquisition channels to more quickly and less
expensively deliver these capabilities. In 2008, we found that DOD has
made progress in putting a program management structure in place for
ORS as well as executing ORS-related research and development efforts,
which include development of low cost small satellites, common design
techniques, and common interfaces.
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Legislation introduced in recent years has also focused on improving
space and weapon acquisitions. In March, the Senate Committee on Armed
Services introduced an acquisition reform bill which contains provisions
that could significantly improve DOD’s management of space programs.
For instance, the bill focuses on various measures, including increasing
emphasis on systems engineering and developmental testing, instituting
earlier preliminary design reviews and strengthening independent cost
estimates and technology readiness assessments. Taken together, these
measures could instill more discipline in the front end of the acquisition
process when it is critical for programs to gain knowledge. The bill also
requires greater involvement by the combatant commands in determining
requirements and requiring greater consultation among the requirements,
budget, and acquisition processes. In addition, several of the bill’s
sections, as currently drafted, would require in law what DOD policy
already encourages, but it is not being implemented consistently in
weapon programs. In April, the House Committee on Armed Services
introduced a bill to similarly reform DOD’s system for acquiring weapons
by providing for, among other things, oversight early in product
development and for appointment of independent officials to review
acquisition programs. Both bills are moving forward in the Senate and
House.
The actions that the Air Force and Office of the Secretary of Defense have
been taking to address acquisition problems are good steps. However,
there are still more significant changes to processes, policies, and support
needed to ensure reforms can take hold. With requirements, resource
allocation, and acquisition processes led by different organizations, it is
difficult to hold any one person or organization accountable for saying no
to a proposed program or for ensuring that the department’s portfolio of
programs is balanced. This makes it difficult for DOD to achieve a
balanced mix of weapon systems that are affordable and feasible. For
example, diffused leadership has been problematic with the GPS program
in terms of DOD’s ability to synchronize delivery of space, ground, and
user assets. GPS has a separate budget, management, oversight, and
leadership structures for the space, ground, and user equipment segments.
Several recent studies have also concluded that there is a need to
strengthen leadership for military and intelligence space efforts. The
Allard Commission reported that responsibilities for military space and
intelligence programs are scattered across the staffs of the DOD and the
Intelligence Community and that it appears that “no one is in charge” of
national-security space. The HPSCI expressed similar concerns in its
report, focusing specifically on difficulties in bringing together decisions
that would involve both the Director of National Intelligence and the
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Secretary of Defense. Prior studies, including those conducted by the
Defense Science Board and the Commission to Assess United States
National Security Space Management and Organization (Space
Commission)
4 have identified similar problems, both for space as a whole
and for specific programs. While these studies have made
recommendations for strengthening leadership for space acquisitions, no
major changes to the leadership structure have been made in recent years.
In fact, an “executive agent” position within the Air Force that was
designated in 2001 in response to a Space Commission recommendation to
provide leadership has not been filled since the last executive resigned in
2007.
In addition, more actions may be needed to address shortages of
personnel in program offices for major space programs. We recently
reported that personnel shortages at the EELV program office have
occurred, particularly in highly specialized areas, such as avionics and
launch vehicle groups. Program officials stated that 7 of 12 positions in the
engineering branch for the Atlas group were vacant. These engineers work
on issues such as reviewing components responsible for navigation and
control of the rocket. Moreover, only half of the government jobs in some
key areas were projected to be filled. These and other shortages in the
EELV program office heightened concerns about DOD’s ability to use a
cost-reimbursement contract acquisition strategy for EELV since that
strategy requires greater government attention to the contractor’s
technical, cost, and schedule performance information. In previous
reviews, we cited personnel shortages at program offices for TSAT as well
as for cost estimators across space. While increased reliance on contractor
employees has helped to address workforce shortages, it could ultimately
create gaps in areas of expertise that could limit the government’s ability
to conduct oversight.
Further, while actions are being undertaken to make more realistic cost
estimates, programs are still producing schedule estimates that are
optimistic while promising that they will not miss their schedule goals. The
GPS IIIA program, for example, is asking the contractor to develop a larger
satellite bus to accommodate the future GPS increments and to increase
the power of a new military signal by a factor of ten, but the schedule is 3
years shorter than the one achieved so far on GPS IIF. We recognize that
4 Department of Defense. Report of the Commission to Assess United States National
Security Space Management and Organization
(Washington, D.C.: Jan. 11, 2001).
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the GPS IIIA program has built a more solid foundation for success than
the IIF program. This foundation offers the best course to deliver on time,
but meeting an ambitious schedule goal should not be the Air Force’s only
measure for mitigating potential capability gaps. Last year, we also
reported that the SBIRS program’s revised schedule estimates for
addressing software problems appeared too optimistic. For example,
software experts, independent reviewers, as well as the government
officials we interviewed agreed that the schedule was aggressive, and the
Defense Contract Management Agency has repeatedly highlighted the
schedule as high risk.
In conclusion, senior leaders managing DOD’s space portfolio are working
in a challenging environment. There are pressures to deliver new,
transformational capabilities, but problematic older satellite programs
continue to cost more than expected, constrain investment dollars, pose
risks of capability caps, and thus require more time and attention from
senior leaders than well-performing efforts. Moreover, military space is at
a critical juncture. There are critical capabilities that are at risk of falling
behind their current level of service. To best mitigate these circumstances
and put future programs on a better path, DOD needs to focus foremost on
sustaining current capabilities and preparing for potential gaps. In
addition, there is still a looming question of how military and intelligence
space activities should be organized and led. From an acquisition
perspective, what is important is that the right decisions are made on
individual programs, the right capability is in place to manage them, and
there is someone to hold accountable when programs go off track.
Concluding Remarks
Mr. Chairman, this concludes my prepared statement. I would be happy to
answer any questions you or members of the subcommittee may have at
this time.
For further information about this statement, please contact Cristina
Chaplain at (202) 512-4841 or chaplainc@gao.gov. Contact points for our
Offices of Congressional Relations and Pubic Affairs may be found on the
last page of this statement. Individuals who made key contributions to this
statement include Art Gallegos, Assistant Director; Maria Durant; Arturo
Holguin; Laura Holliday; Rich Horiuchi; Karen Sloan; Alyssa Weir; and
Peter Zwanzig.
Contacts and
Acknowledgements
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GAO-09-705T
Appendix I: Scope and Methodology
In preparing this testimony, we relied on our body of work in space
programs, including previously issued GAO reports on assessments of
individual space programs, common problems affecting space system
acquisitions, and the Department of Defense’s (DOD) acquisition policies.
We relied on our best practices studies, which comment on the persistent
problems affecting space acquisitions, the actions DOD has been taking to
address these problems, and what remains to be done. We also relied on
work performed in support of our 2009 annual weapons system
assessment. The individual reviews were conducted in accordance with
generally accepted government auditing standards. Those standards
require that we plan and perform the audit to obtain sufficient, appropriate
evidence to provide a reasonable basis for our findings and conclusions
based on our audit objectives. We believe that the evidence obtained
provides a reasonable basis for our findings and conclusions based on our
audit objectives.
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GAO-09-705T
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